Radicalism at Home and Abroad- Sanders, Trump, and Destability Tactics in Russia
I. Historical Context of the modern Russian question.
In a very real sense, all of the history of the modern world comes back to age-old conflicts between East and West. Since Darius I was defeated at the battle of Marathon in 490 B.C., Orient and Occident have collided in every generation. Rome ultimately fell apart at last, torn to shreds, in a wild fight for dominance between the two lions that were Islam and Christianity. The Crusades were fought for the same reasons that Eastern Europe is a fracture point today. There exists no workable integration function for these two societies. The Turk and the Magyar have been at each other's throats since both were mountain tribes from the Dark Ages. They are neighbors, and the bitterest of enemies. They save their worst cruelties for each other, and this struggle has repeated itself in every generation.
The cruelties of Vlad Tepes and Ivan IV were born of this ferocious climate, and Stalin and Putin as well. We are dealing with people who are absolutely dedicated to mayhem and slaughter. To conclude otherwise would be to underestimate the Russians entirely, as recent history proves, particularly in regards to their Ukrainian neighbors, who have suffered such outrage in the matter of the Crimea. That mistake could well prove fatal. Hitler didn't conquer Europe in a day, either. He took it piece by piece, starting with his annexation of Austria, done under cover of a casus belli markedly similar to what we now see in Ukraine. And when he saw that the Western democracies would do nothing, he continued to take.
History is full of times when a sudden death-blow has been enough to topple an empire. Xenophon's March of the Ten Thousand in 400 B.C. back out of the hostile lands of the Persian Empire revealed a key weakness at its jugular, and Alexander savaged it in another seventy years. He broke Darius III's army of a million men in one day. An assessment of Russian behavior in recent years makes it impossible to be certain that their intention is not, in fact, to deliver such a blow. We need to wake up before it's too late. This point is relevant especially regarding certain members of the American left, embittered by the landslide defeat of Bernie Sanders, who don't realize that Stalin and DWS are not war criminals of the same order.
Just as they did in ancient times, conflicts in the borderlands between Eastern Europe and the Middle East create one of the weakest links in the global order. Repercussions dating from the Crusades and before continue to play out along the same old lines. These conflicts are now generally viewed as being causally religious, but factors relating to land, money, and local customs have also been influencing them from the start. . Understanding the history of Muslim-Christian relations is necessary to give context to the fact of these fundamental weaknesses in our global texture. They are faultlines that the stability of our world order may fracture down. There is no workable integration function for these people to make room for one another in their cultures, and as a result there is an unending struggle between them. Putin's insistence on attempting to worsen and exploit these rifts constitutes a terrible threat to stability everywhere, of course, but the people in these regions are at particular risk, and should not be overlooked by global eyes.
The formula for how Russia projects power, in Europe and elsewhere, is known as its Trojan Horse strategy. Its goals are the same as in the days of the Cold War- to create a Russian-led infrastructure of political leaders, parties, and civil society organizations. These auxiliaries have the dual purpose of legitimizing Russia’s aims to destabilize European unity and to undermine European values. In the West, the Russian government cannot rely on a large and highly concentrated Russian-speaking minority for its local superiority of force, as it can in its own backyard. It also lacks the same historical or cultural links. In this context, the Kremlin’s destabilization tactics have been subtler.
The relationship between Russia and Western Europe’s far right may have started out a marriage of convenience, but it would appear they have genuinely grown on each other. In addition to their ideological connection, the far right parties of Europe depend on Russia to provide them their financial backbone. It is clearly to the benefit of the Russians to cultivate closer bonds between rising political parties in the EU. Having people he paid for in office, e.g. Marine Le Pen, will obviously give Putin more leverage against NATO. The European right seems to have come to view the Russian leader as a bulwark defender of national sovereignty and conservative values. He has won their admiration and emulation by challenging US influence, and redefining the idea of “Europe” in a way that mirrors their own convictions.
The far right’s major gripe with the European Union is the euro. While economic unity has allowed Europe a degree of superpower status, it also strips eurozone countries of control over their monetary policy. During the economic crisis of the last few years, an immense anger has grown up at the state of things. That anger has forced all of Western Europe to bend. Unpopular austerity measures set by the European Central Bank in Frankfurt have been portrayed as a terrible blunder, and one that is the fault of centrist political leaders and voters, typified by Hillary Clinton and her supporters. Even the Germans, who remain the most pro-European members of the eurozone, are beginning to admit their mistake. All this has been of tremendous use to the Russians, who were recently a superpower, and are still a power feared and held in awe by many in Europe. They are ostensibly offering a viable alternative to what many people see as a burden and a failure. Combating this illusory idea needs to be a central point in the American narrative and interpretation of world events.
For the far right movements of Europe, endorsing the Crimean referendum has been their carom shot. That event gave them framework to display their defiance of the European Union and its growing influence over national politics. It was also an endorsement of Putin's brand of nationalism and social conservatism, and therefore Putin himself. Le Pen, for example, has consistently remained a loyal advocate for Putin. She derided the EU as an “anti-democratic monster”, and in the same breath sang the praises of Putin for doing “what is good for Russia and the Russians.” Meanwhile, the leader of Britain’s UKIP, Nigel Farage, sees Putin as a “brilliant” strategist, one capable of outfoxing the indolent West. When asked which world leader he admired the most, Farage’s answer was immediate and unequivocal. Vladimir Putin.
Russia’s affection for Le Pen and her fellow travelers amounts to more than just gratitude for her endorsement of the annexation of Crimea. The key unifying factor between these two forces is a shared anti-Americanism. According to a recent survey by the Levada Center, in Moscow, seventy-one percent of Russians have a “bad or very bad” opinion of the United States. In fact, Russians’ opinion of the United States is the lowest since the fall of the Soviet Union. And since the election of Donald Trump, we don't much like them, either. Obama's expulsion of 35 Russian officials was a harsher sanction than anything ever seen in the days of the Cold War. Lines are being drawn, and Russia is counting its allies.
